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Abstract
We analyze the implications of endogenizing information collection and
reputational concerns for the performance of a sequential decision structure.
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1 Introduction
In the last three decades, several studies have appeared on the relationship between
the various ways decisions are made in organizations on the one hand and the per-
formance of organizations on the other hand. A seminal paper is by Sah and Stiglitz
(1986), who studied situations in which individuals have to screen projects.1 In their
article, the way the screening process is organised is important for two reasons. First,
individuals make errors of judgement. The implication of this aspect is that it is not
always optimal to delegate the screening decision to one individual. Second, there
are costs of acquiring and communicating information. The more individuals are
involved in the screening process, the higher are these costs.
It is not very surprising that in a Sah and Stiglitz setting, sequential decision
procedures are quite attractive. To understand why, consider an organizational unit
responsible for the screening of project proposals the organization receives. One
could think of, say, drafts of books submitted for publication with a publisher,
music demos sent to a record company, or a request for a loan led with a bank.
Suppose the unit is made up of two persons. The expected benets are negative so
that implementation of the project requires that both individuals accept the project.
Suppose a sequential decision procedure in which the project is rst evaluated by
one person. If this person accepts, then the project is forwarded to the second
person who makes the nal decision. If the rst person rejects, then the project is
discarded.2 Clearly, compared to a situation in which two persons simultaneously
evaluate projects, the sequential decision procedure saves on evaluation costs. If the
rst person rejects the projects, the second person does not have to evaluate the
project anymore. Compared to a situation in which the decision is made by a single
individual, the sequential decision procedure has the advantage that some errors of
judgement of the rst person can be corrected by the second person.
Without doubt, the literature building on Sah and Stiglitz has yielded many
insights into the pros and cons of alternative decision procedures. However, a main
1Related papers include Sah and Stiglitz (1988), Young (1988), Ladha (1992), Koh (1992), Ben-
Yashar and Nitzan (1997), Gehrig et al. (2000), and Visser (2000). Other seminal contributions
include Marschak and Radner (1972) and Keren and Levhari (1983).
2In case the expected benets of the project are positive so that status quo requires that two
individuals reject the project, then the decision is forwarded to the second individual if and only
if the rst individual rejects.
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drawback is that it ignores the e¤ect of the internal structure of an organization on
its membersincentives to acquire information.
In this paper we examine the performance of a standard two-step sequential
decision procedure in a situation in which the individuals participating do not au-
tomatically behave in line with the interest of the organization. Our model di¤ers
from that of Sah and Stiglitz in two important aspects. First, we endogenise the
process of opinion formation or information acquisition.3 To see the relevance of this
deviation, consider the examples of the selection processes given above. Evaluating
the merits of a book or a demo, and the risks associated with a potential borrower
takes time and e¤ort. Moreover, whether e¤ort is exerted is a matter of choice. Each
individual has to decide whether or not to collect information. Given that in Sah
and Stiglitz the cost of information collection plays an essential role, endogenising
the acquisition of information seems to be a natural extension of their model.
The second deviation is that we assume that apart from caring about the project
payo¤, individuals are concerned with their reputation as decision makers. Arguably,
one of the key assets of a publisher, a record company, or a bank is its ability to
separate the wheat from the cha¤. It is therefore likely that people who are successful
at identifying good proposals are worth more to the organization and are therefore
more likely to be kept and promoted. As a consequence, an employee evaluating the
quality of a proposal is likely to care about his perceived screening ability. We assume
that there are two types of employees, smart and dumb ones. Smart employees are
more likely to make correct decisions than dumb employees. The reputation of an
individual is dened as the (posterior) probability that he is smart.
We derive two results. First, if reputational concerns are su¢ ciently strong
and the individualsabilities do not di¤er too much, then the rst individual in the
decision process does not collect information and always delegates the decision about
the project to the second individual. Evidently, the performance of a sequential
decision procedure is then identical to the performance of a procedure that delegates
the decision about the project immediately to agent 2. To understand our rst result,
suppose that the rst individual in the decision process collected information and
accepted the project. As we know from the herding literature, reputational concerns
3For another recent study that pays attention to information acquisition in a Sah and Stiglitz
setting see Gehrig (2004) and the comments by Demougin (2004).
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give then an incentive to the second individual to accept the project too, irrespective
of her information. As information is endogenous, agent 2 therefore decides not to
exert e¤ort to acquire information. Agent 1 anticipates the behaviour of agent 2.
The behaviour of agent 2, however, is conditional on the behaviour of agent 1. By
not collecting information, agent 1 eliminates agent 2s incentive to refrain from
exerting e¤ort. At this point, the public good feature of information is important.
Concerning information collection, each agent wants to free-ride on the other agent.
Agent 1 can do so by directly forwarding the decision to agent 2.
Another way of putting our rst result is that endogenising information in a
model with reputational concerns changes the possible distortion in the decision
process from herding to free-riding. Our second result is that endogenising infor-
mation aggravates the distortion, in the sense that with endogenous information
free-riding occurs for a wider range of parameters than herding with exogenous
information.
The practical implication of our ndings is that where a sequential decision
structure would have been best from a project payo¤perspective, in practice we may
see that the decision is taken by a single person. The loang makes it unattractive
to keep two employees.
To illustrate the relevance of our paper, rst consider the way a typical Dutch
literary publisher evaluates a new manuscript submitted for publication.4 First, the
publisher checks whether or not the manuscript ts in its collection. Next, the real
screening starts. The book is given to an editor. Only if this editor has a positive
view, another editor (or an external reader) is involved. If this agent is also positive,
the author will be invited for a meeting.
Now consider the way a typical Dutch bank evaluates a request for a standard
loan (up to euro 250,000).5 In the rst stage, a commercial agent helps the client to
submit a proposal. Once the proposal has been completed, it is sent to a nancial
analyst who evaluates its merits. If the proposal is approved, it is checked whether
the analyst has the authority to approve the proposal. If so, the loan can be provided.
The di¤erence between the publisher case and the bank case is clear. The pub-
4See the website set up by nine Dutch publishers at
http://www.boekboek.nl/boekboek/show/id=2808.
5Rabobank Group (internal document for provision of loans, and personal communication with
J.G. Schuitemaker).
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lisher case is a typical example of a sequential decision procedure as discussed at
the beginning of the introduction. In the bank case, the screening of standard loans
is done by one agent. After the screening, the procedure is checked (in particular,
whether the analyst has the authority to approve the proposal). Our paper gives a
possible explanantion for the di¤erence between the two screening procedures. This
explanantion requires that relative to nancial analysts, editors care more about
their product, and less about their reputation.
Apart from the literature on the internal structure of organizations, our paper
is related to the literature on herd behaviour. Our model is similar in spirit to
one studied by Scharfstein and Stein (1990). They consider a situation in which
agents make decisions with a view to manipulating inferences regarding their ability.
Like us, they consider a situation in which agents make decisions sequentially. Our
model di¤ers from Scharfstein and Stein in three respects. First, in our model, the
agents make a decision about one public project instead of two private projects.
Second, information is endogenised. Third, agents do not only care about their
reputation but are also concerned with project outcomes.6 One of the main results
of Scharfstein and Stein is that the second agent has an incentive to mimic the
rst agent, by ignoring private information. This incentive also plays an essential
role in our model. With endogenous information and a public project, however, the
incentive to mimic leads to free-riding rather than herding.
Our paper is also closely related to Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001) who study the
consequences of statistical and reputational herding for the optimal order in which
agents speak. They show that reputational concerns may imply that it is better
to let agents participate in the decision process who are not too smart. As we will
show, this also holds true in our model. In their model, however, information is
exogenous and agents are exclusively concerned with their reputation.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section sets out the
model. Section 3 analyses the model and presents the equilibria. Section 4 analyzes
a model in which agents attach a direct cost to disagreeing with each other. Section
5 summarises our main results. Proofs can be found in the appendix.
6Scharfstein and Stein (1990) briey discusses this extension.
5
2 The Model
2.1 Decision Procedure
Two agents i = 1; 2 have to make a decision about a project. This decision is
made sequentially. Agent 1 is the rst to look at the project. If he decides to
reject the project, X1 = 0, the status quo is maintained. If instead he decides to
accept the project, X1 = 1, it moves on to the second agent, whose verdict is nal.
That is, project implementation requires fX1 = 1; X2 = 1g, whereas fX1 = 0g and
fX1 = 1; X2 = 0g imply that the status quo will be maintained.
There are two states of the world  2 f h; hg. Each state occurs with an ex
ante probability 1
2
. If the project is implemented, the project yields p+  utility to
each agent, where p denotes the expected benet of the project. By normalisation,
status quo does not deliver utility. Throughout, we assume that  h < p < 0.
The implication of this assumption is that the correct decision about the project
depends on the state of the world. Moreover, without further information about ,
each agent prefers rejection to implementation.
Before deciding on the project, an agent i may examine the pros and cons of
the project. The e¤ort that comes with this is costly to the agent, C. Whether
e¤ort is of any use depends on the type ti or quality of agent i who undertakes
the research. A smart agent, t = sm, is more likely to benet from the outcomes
than a dumb agent. In fact, we assume that a smart agent fully benets from the
research he undertakes: the signal si = fb; gg he receives is fully informative (si = g
if and only if  = h; si = b if and only if  =  h). Any research undertaken by
a dumb agent, t = du, on the other hand, is to no avail. That is, a dumb agent
receives an uninformative signal: si = g with probability 12 , independent of the true
state of the world7. If no e¤ort is exerted, the agent bases his decision on his prior
knowledge and his position in the decision structure. We assume that agents do not
know whether they are smart or dumb. Agent i only knows that he is smart with
probability i. This probability is common knowledge.
Let us briey justify why we deviate from the Sah and Stiglitz setting by as-
suming that agents have di¤erent types. In Sah and Stiglitz, agents do not di¤er in
7Qualitatively the same results would be obtained if one were to assume that a smart (dumb)
agent receives an informative signal with probability s (d), with s > d.
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types, but signals di¤er in quality. The reason for assuming types of agents rather
than types of signals is our focus on reputational concerns. In our model, agents are
concerned about how the market perceives their abilities. These concerns lead to
herding with exogenous information, and as we show in our model, to free riding with
endogenous information. For reputational concerns to be e¤ective, the existence of
types of agents is required.
2.2 Timing
At the beginning of the game, nature chooses the state of the world, and the types
of agents. Next, agent 1 decides whether to exert e¤ort. Then in the absence or
presence of a signal he must decide whether to reject the project, X1 = 0, or to
recommend implementation, X1 = 1. We assume that an agent can show that
he has not exerted e¤ort. The motivation of this assumption is that information
collection takes time. By choosingX1 = 1 instantaneously, agent 1 can signal that he
has not exerted e¤ort. However, an agent cannot prove that he has exerted e¤ort.
Waiting does not prove that agent 1 has exerted e¤ort. If agent 1 has chosen
implementation, the project moves on for evaluation by agent 2. Agent 2 decides
whether to exert e¤ort or not, and whether the project should be implemented,
X2 = 1, or rejected, X2 = 0. At the end of the game, the organization updates
its beliefs about the probability that each agent is smart, based on the individual
decisions made by the agents; fX1 = 1g, fX1 = 1; X2 = 1g, and fX1 = 1; X2 = 0g.
We assume that the organization does not observe the true state of the world when
the project is implemented. At the end of this paper, we will come back to this
assumption.
2.3 Preferences
The agents are concerned both with the outcomes of the project the expected
project payo¤ and with their reputation. Agent is reputation is dened as the
posterior probability that i is smart, bi. The payo¤ to i, net of any cost of exerting
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e¤ort C, equals
Ui (X1 = 1; X2 = 1) = p+ + bi (X1 = 1; X2 = 1)
Ui (X1 = 1; X2 = 0) = bi (X1 = 1; X2 = 0) (1)
Ui (X1 = 0) = bi (X1 = 0)
In equation (1),  denotes the weight an agent places on reputation relative to the
outcomes of the project.
2.4 The Economic Environment
We make two sets of assumptions in order to guarantee an interesting economic
environment. First, we assume that in case of decision making by a single agent, a
situation we call delegation, this agent will exert e¤ort and follow his signal. This
amounts to assuming that8 ;9
Assumption 1 In case of single agent decision making (delegation), an agent
implements the project only if the signal is positive, p+ ih > 0 for both i = 1; 2.
Assumption 2 In case of single agent decision making, an agent exerts e¤ort,
1
2
(p+ ih) > C for both i = 1; 2.
Note that a bad signal leads to project rejection without further assumptions as
p   ih < p < 0. A similar set of assumptions is made to make a sequential
decision structure interesting and viable if agents are only driven by the projects
payo¤. That is, conditional on having exerted e¤ort, the agents should be willing to
follow their respective signals. Assumption 1 ensures that two positive signals lead
to implementation. What remains to be guaranteed is that in case of conicting
signals s1 6= s2 the expected project payo¤ net of costs of e¤ort is negative or zero,
Assumption 3 In case of two conicting signals, the project payo¤ is negative or
zero, p+ E (jsi = g; sj = b) = p+ i j1 ij h  0
8Note that if the condition in Assumption 2 holds, so does the one in Assumption 1. We prefer
to present these assumptions separately because they refer to di¤erent stages in the decision making
process.
9In the Appendix, part A.2, we show that the mathematical statements imply the desired
behaviour.
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Were this not the case, one would want to delegate the decision to agent i, as a good
signal received by this agent would have such a large likelihood to be informative
that the worst possible information the other agent can receive (a negative signal)
would not change the verdict on the project. With assumption 3, a statistical
cascadewill not occur as it is not rational to ignore a second, bad signal10. We
further assume that if agent 1 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal, the increase in
expected project payo¤ thanks to the addition of agent 2s e¤ort exceeds the costs of
this additional e¤ort. Conditional on agent 1 having exerted e¤ort and following his
signal, implementation by agent 2 without exerting e¤ort yields p+ 1h. If agent 2
exerts e¤ort and follows his signal his payo¤becomes 1
2
(1 + 12) p+
1
2
(1 + 2)h 
C.
Assumption 4 If agent 1 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal, the increase in ex-
pected project payo¤ thanks to agent 2s e¤ort exceeds the costs of this e¤ort, 1
2
(12   1) p+
1
2
(2   1)h > C.
Similarly, without reputational concerns agent 1 would be willing to exert e¤ort and
follow his signal if agent 2 already exerts e¤ort and follows her signal. This requires
that
Assumption 5 If agent 2 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal, agent 1s e¤ort is
e¢ cient, 1
4
(12   1) p+ 14 (1   2)h > C.
The assumptions (3), (4) and (5) are necessary and su¢ cient to make a sequential
decision structure viable and interesting.11
3 Analysis
Ours is a dynamic model with incomplete information. An equilibrium species for
each agent i a decision rule that determines whether to exert e¤ort, and whether to
accept the project possibly conditional on a signal such that expected utility is
maximised, given the strategy of the other agent and the posterior beliefs held by
10For an introduction to the cascading literature, see Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer, and Welch
(1998) and the references therein.
11Note once again that if assumptions (4) and (5) hold so does assumption (3).
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the market. For the market, it means that the posterior beliefs are formed according
to Bayesrule12.
3.1 Agent 2
We start by analysing the behaviour of agent 2 who has received a project from
agent 1. Suppose agent 1 exerted e¤ort and followed his signal. In this section we
analyse the best reply of agent 2 in this situation. Although we assume that agent
2 cannot observe with what likelihood agent 1 exerted e¤ort, in equilibrium this is
known. In Section 3.2, we analyse under which conditions agent 1 exerts e¤ort and
show that if agent 1 exerts e¤ort, he will always follow his signal.
Posterior beliefs
Below we will argue that if agent 2 receives a positive signal, she has no incentive
to reject the project. However, if agent 2 receives a negative signal, she may vote
for implementation. Therefore, let  be the probability with which agent 2 exerts
e¤ort, let  be the probability the project is accepted if she receives a signal that is
negative, and assume the project is accepted if she receives a positive signal. Lemma
1 states the posterior beliefs concerning agent 2s type.
Lemma 1 Suppose agent 1 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal. Suppose X2 = 1 if
s2 = g. Let  = Pr (2 exerts e¤ort) and  = Pr (X2 = 1js2 = b). Then the posterior
beliefs about agent 2s type equal
b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 0) =  1  1
1  12

2 < 2 (2)
b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 1) = 2   (1  ) (1  1)
2   (1  ) (1  12)2  2 (3)
Observe that, once agent 1 has passed on the project for a nal decision to agent
2, the reputation of the latter is hurt by project rejection. The reason is that
project rejection by agent 2 reveals that she received a negative signal, or, more
importantly, a signal di¤erent from agent 1s. As smart people who exert e¤ort
receive identical signals, opposing signals reduce the probability that either agent,
including the second agent, is smart. By the same token, agent 2 strengthens her
12Bayesrule will be used where possible. A plausible posterior will be provided otherwise.
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reputation by mimicking agent 1s decision as this suggests she received a positive
signal.
Project Choice
We continue to assume that agent 1 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal. Assume agent
2 has exerted e¤ort and has therefore received a signal. The question becomes what
agent 2 decides on the project if s2 = g and s2 = b. The main result of the herding
literature applies. Given that both agents exert e¤ort and thus possess private
information, su¢ ciently strong reputational concerns induce agent 2 to ignore her
private signal and to mimic agent 1. In case of a positive signal, she prefers project
implementation to rejection as this leads both to a positive project payo¤ and to a
better reputation. In case of a negative signal, rejection gives her
b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 0)  C (4)
whereas implementation yields
p+
1   2
1  12h+ b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 1)  C (5)
Therefore, if agent 2 received signal s2 = b, whether she prefers rejection to imple-
mentation depends on the sign of
p+
1   2
1  12h

+  (b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 1)  b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 0)) (6)
The rst term in brackets is negative by Assumption 3, p + 1 2
1 12h < 0. She
ignores a negative signal and accepts the project,  = 1, if she cares considerably
about her reputation,  > . The negative expected project payo¤ stemming from
implementation is more than o¤set by the increase in ex post reputation. Only if
she cares little about her reputation,  < , will she refrain from accepting the
project in case of a negative signal,  = 0. For intermediate values,  2 [; ],
she sometimes ignores her negative signal and accepts the project,  2 [0; 1].13
13Of course, the posterior belief b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 1) depends on and is consistent with each type
of behaviour of agent 2 (i.e., with the value of ), see the proof of Lemma 2
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Lemma 2 Suppose agent 1 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal. Suppose agent 2
exerts e¤ort. Then, for  < , agent 2 follows her signal,  = 0; for  2 [; ],
she sometimes ignores a bad signal (probabilistic herding),  2 [0; 1]; and for
 > , she herds with probability one,  = 1.
In particular, if agent 2 cares exclusively about her reputation, which amounts to
!1 in our model, she always herds.
E¤ort
Now that we have derived the behaviour of agent 2 conditional on e¤ort having
been exerted, we turn to the conditions which rule her decision to exert e¤ort or
not. If agent 2 does not exert e¤ort,  = 0, it is optimal to implement the project.
Recall that we have assumed that decision making by one agent yields more than
always maintaining the status quo, see assumption 1. Essentially, not exerting e¤ort
amounts to delegating the decision to agent 1. Agent 2s payo¤ then equals:
p+ 1h+ b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 1) (7)
If agent 2 exerts e¤ort, she anticipates how she will react to signals. As shown in
lemma 2, if agent 2 cares considerably about her reputation,  > , she will herd
if she exerts e¤ort a project that reaches her desk is implemented irrespective of
her signal. Clearly, in this case, agent 2 does not exert e¤ort and always implements
a project that lands on her desk  nobody is willing to pay for information that
will surely not be used.
If agent 2 cares to a moderate degree about her reputation,  2 [; ], exerting
e¤ort and sometimes implementing a project in case of s2 = b yields a payo¤ equal
to
1
2
(1 + 12)

p+
1 + 2
1 + 12
h+ b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 1)+
1
2
(1  12)

p+
1   2
1  12h+ b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 1)

  C
= p+ 1h+ b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 1)  C (8)
In deriving (8), we used that if agent 2 mixes in case of a bad signal s2 = b, a signal
she receives with probability 1
2
(1  12), she is indi¤erent between implementation
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and rejection. This implies that before observing the signal s2 2 fg; bg, agent
2 knows that implementation yields at least as much as rejection. Under such
circumstances, it does not make sense to exert costly e¤ort to obtain a signal. This
is also borne out by a comparison of equations (8) and (7). For  2 [; ], then,
agent 2 prefers not exerting e¤ort to exerting e¤ort. Lemma 3 sums up the discussion
so far.
Lemma 3 If information is costly, neither herding nor probabilistic herding occurs
in equilibrium. Instead of (probabilistic) herding taking place, information is not
acquired.
The situation that remains to be studied is the one in which agent 2 cares
relatively little about her reputation,  < . In that case, with the costs of e¤ort
sunk, information is used e¢ ciently. In particular, a signal s2 = b leads to project
rejection as the gain in reputation stemming from project acceptance is more than
o¤set by the reduction in project payo¤. As without information agent 2 would
accept the project, exerting e¤ort is only useful if a negative signal is obtained and
leads to a rejection of the project (a positive signal leads to project acceptance).
For  less than but very close to , agent 2 would have followed her negative signal
if she were to have it for free. However, for any positive costs, she is unwilling to
exert the e¤ort and incur the costs. In other words, for any cost level C, there is a
value C < 
 such that for  > C , agent 2 is unwilling to exert e¤ort, even though
she would use the information e¢ ciently once it were there. The benet of exerting
e¤ort and then following ones signal as compared with not exerting e¤ort and
implementing the project is the increase in project payo¤. Exerting e¤ort is however
costly per se, and hurts ones reputation in the event of a negative signal. Only if
agent 2 cares su¢ ciently little about her reputation,  < C , where C < C < 
,
will agent 2 follow her signal and exert e¤ort. Lemma 4 states the exact conditions.14
Lemma 4 Suppose agent 1 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal. Furthermore suppose
that the posterior beliefs are given by (2) and (3). Then, the unique best reply of
14Note that we do not report behaviour of agent 2 in case she receives a bad signal, , if  > C
as she refrains from exerting e¤ort,  = 0, and will never receive a signal in the rst place. Of
course, the values of C and C depend on and are consistent with the behaviour of agent 2, see
the proof.
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agent 2 is as follows. For  < C, agent 2 exerts e¤ort and follows her signal,
 = 1,  = 0. For  2 C ; C, agent 2 exerts e¤ort with probability , where
 is the root of (A.11), and follows her signal if she has one,  = 0. For  > C,
agent 2 exerts no e¤ort, and chooses X2 = 1, 
 = 0,  = 1. Furthermore,
C < C < 
.
By Assumption 2, if agent 1 does not exert e¤ort if he delegates the decision on
the project to agent 2 agent 2 is better o¤ exerting e¤ort and following her signal
than following any other strategy.
3.2 Agent 1 and Equilibrium Selection
Project Choice
We now analyse the behaviour of agent 1. We rst assume he has exerted e¤ort
and received a signal. Suppose he has received a negative signal, s1 = b. The
best he can do is to maintain the status quo. First, on the basis of Assumption 3,
even if agent 2 were to receive a positive signal, expected project payo¤ would be
negative. Second, passing on the project to agent 2 would not improve his expected
reputation. Now suppose he has received a positive signal, s1 = g. Rejection would
lead to a project payo¤ equal to zero. Acceptance either leads to agent 2 exerting
e¤ort and following her signal (for  < C), or to agent 2 being indi¤erent between
exerting e¤ort or not (for  2 C ; C), or to agent 2 preferring not to exert e¤ort
and implement the project without further ado ( > C). In any case, expected
project payo¤s are larger than zero, while the expected reputation of agent 1 is left
una¤ected. Hence, acceptance dominates rejection in case of a good signal.
Lemma 5 In any equilibrium in which agent 1 exerts e¤ort, he follows his signal.
E¤ort
Now consider the e¤ort decision. By assumption, agent 1 can show that he has
not exerted e¤ort. If agent 1 does not exert e¤ort, he prefers delegating the decision
about the project to rejecting it out of hand. His payo¤ equals
1
2
(p+ 2h) + 1. (9)
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If agent 1 does exert e¤ort, agent 2s reaction is described in Lemma 4. Three cases
have to be distinguished. First, if agent 2 cares little about her reputation,  < C ,
she exerts e¤ort and follows her signal if agent 1 does. In subsection 2.4, we have
characterized the economic environment in such a way that agent 1 is willing to
exert e¤ort if agent 2 exerts e¤ort and follows her signal, see assumption 5.
Lemma 6 For  < C, agent 1 exerts e¤ort (and follows his signal).
For the two remaining cases,  2 C ; C and  > C , it is important to observe
that if agent 1 is the only agent to exert e¤ort (because agent 2 does not exert e¤ort
and implements a project with probability one if agent 1 exerts e¤ort), then the
payo¤ for agent 1 equals
1
2
(p+ 1h) + 1   C. (10)
A comparison of expressions (9) and (10) shows that if
1
2
(1   2)h  C (11)
agent 1 (weakly) prefers to decide about the project himself rather than letting the
decision on the project depend solely on agent 2. As a consequence, if this inequality
holds, agent 1 prefers exerting e¤ort to delegating the decision to agent 2 both if
the latter agent cares to a moderate degree about her reputation,  2 C ; C, and
if she cares considerably about her reputation,  > C .
Consider rst the case that  2 C ; C. Then from Lemma 4 we know that
with probability  agent 2 exerts e¤ort and follows her signal if agent 1 exerts
e¤ort. We know by assumption 5 that agent 1 then benets from exerting e¤ort.
With probability 1    agent 2 does not exert e¤ort but implements the project.
If equation (11) holds, agent 1 still prefers to exert e¤ort rather than delegating the
decision to agent 2. That is, whether agent 2 exerts e¤ort or not, agent 1 prefers
exerting e¤ort to not exerting e¤ort.
Similarly, for  > C , agent 2 does not exert e¤ort but implements the project
if agent 1 exerts e¤ort. Once again, if equation (11) holds, agent 1 prefers to exert
e¤ort rather than delegating the decision to agent 2.
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Lemma 7 For 1
2
(1   2)h  C, agent 1 exerts e¤ort independent of the behaviour
of agent 2. In particular, the degree to which agent 2 cares about his reputation is
unimportant.
If instead
1
2
(1   2)h < C (12)
agent 1 prefers delegating the decision on the project to agent 2 compared to being
the only one to decide on the project. For  > C , then, agent 1 refrains from
exerting e¤ort and delegates the decision to agent 2. If equality (12) holds and
 2 C ; C, agent 1s choice of exerting e¤ort or not depends on the likelihood
with which agent 2 exerts e¤ort. If  is close to one, there is a high likelihood that
if agent 1 exerts e¤ort so will agent 2. The resulting payo¤ is larger than what agent
1 can obtain by not exerting e¤ort himself. On the other hand, if  is close to zero,
it is very likely that agent 2 does not exert e¤ort if agent 1 does. In this case, agent
1 would be better o¤ by delegating the decision to agent 2. There is therefore some
value  2 (0; 1) satisfying


1
4
(1 + 12) p+
1
4
(1 + 2)h+ 1   C

+
 
1   1
2
(p+ 1h) + 1   C

=
1
2
(p+ 2h) + 1 (13)
such that for  > , agent 1 exerts e¤ort, whereas for  <  he does not exert
e¤ort but delegates the decision making to agent 2. He is indi¤erent for  =  and
we assume he does not exert e¤ort. As agent 1 cannot inuence the expected value
of his ex post reputation,  is independent of .
Lemma 8 Assume 1
2
(1   2)h < C. If  > C, then agent 1 exerts no e¤ort. If
 2 C ; C, then agent 1 exerts e¤ort if and only if  > , where  solves (13)
and  is the root of (A.11).
We are now ready to state the equilibrium of this game.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium strategies for agents 1 and 2 are as follows.
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1. If  < C, both agents exert e¤ort and follow their respective signals. Posterior
beliefs equal b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 0) =  1 11 12 2 and b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 1) =
1+1
1+12

2.
2. If  2 C ; C and 12 (1   2)h  C, agent 1 exerts e¤ort and follows his
signal, whereas agent 2 exerts e¤ort with probability  and follows her sig-
nal if she has one,  = 0. Posterior beliefs equal b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 1) =
2 (1 1)
2 (1 12)2 and b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 0) =  1 11 12 2.
3. If  2 C ; C, 12 (1   2)h < C and  > , where  is the root of
(A.11), agent 1 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal, and agent 2 exerts e¤ort
with probability , and follows her signal if she has one,  = 0. Posterior
beliefs equal b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 1) = 2 (1 1)2 (1 12)2 and b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 0) =
1 1
1 12

2.
4. If  2 C ; C, 12 (1   2)h < C, and   , where  is the root of (A.11),
agent 1 delegates decision making to agent 2 who exerts e¤ort,  = 1, and
follows her signal,  = 0. Posterior beliefs equal b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 1) =b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 0) = 2.
5. If  > C and 12 (1   2)h  C, agent 1 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal,
whereas agent 2 implements the project without exerting e¤ort,  = 0,  = 1.
The posterior beliefs in case of implementation equals b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 1) =
2, whereas a plausible out-of-equilibrium belief is b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 0) =  1 11 12 2.
6. If  > C and 12 (1   2)h < C, agent 1 delegates decision making to agent
2 who exerts e¤ort,  = 1, and follows her signal,  = 0. Posterior beliefs
equal b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 1) = b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 0) = 2.
Let us interpret these results within the context of our record company example. In
case 1, in which the second expert cares relatively little about her reputation, both
experts spend time listening to the demo and giving a sound advice. In the second
case, the rst expert listens very carefully, whereas the second expert sometimes
refrains from listening at all and simply goes along with the rst experts judgment
without further ado. The rst experts analysis is su¢ ciently more likely to be in-
sightful than the seconds to merit the e¤ort. There is therefore no reason to delegate
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the decision to the second expert. In the third case, the same type of behaviour re-
sults but for a di¤erent reason. Now, besides the second experts moderately strong
interest in her reputation, the expertsabilities are very similar. Both constitute
reasons to delegate the decision to the second expert. What keeps the rst expert
from delegating the decision to the second is the fact that although the latter expert
sometimes mimics the rst experts judgment she does so with a relatively small
likelihood. In the fourth case, this likelihood is substantial. As a result, the expert
who is supposed to evaluate the demo rst immediately forwards it to the second
expert. In both the fth and the sixth case, the second expert cares considerably
about her reputation. Joint decision making is impossible. The rst expert then
has to decide who should decide on the demo, himself or the second expert? This
depends on their relative abilities and the cost of giving a sound advice.
Recall that the economic environment we have assumed in Subsection 2.4 makes
sequential decision making optimal. If agent 2 cares little about her reputation,  <
C , both agents exert e¤ort and follow their private signals. In this case, the total
value generated equals the maximally attainable, 1
4
(1 + 12) p+
1
4
(1 + 2)h  32C.
The cost component 3
2
C points to one of the advantages of a sequential structure,
the fact that agent 2 exerts e¤ort only half of the time. If agent 1 delegates decision
making to agent 2, or if agent 2 does not exert e¤ort with probability one, the
project payo¤ decreases, and the result is ine¢ cient from a project point of view.
Proposition 1 shows that as soon as  > C there is a positive probability that
the decision on the project is distorted. An important implication of Lemma 4 is that
with endogenous information the project decision is distorted for a wider range of
parameters than with exogenous information. Therefore, endogenizing information
makes a sequential decision procedure more vulnerable for the adverse consequences
of reputational concerns.
4 Direct Costs Attached to Disagreeing
In this section, we model the e¤ects of career concerns in a di¤erent way15. Rather
than having the organizations updated belief about the agents level of competence
entering the utility function, we now assume that an agent i su¤ers a loss Ki in case
15We are grateful to an associate editor for suggesting this approach.
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his recommendation does not agree with that of the other agent. An agents utility
function, net of costs of e¤ort becomes:
Ui (X1 = 1; X2 = 1) = p+ 
Ui (X1 = 1; X2 = 0) =  Ki (14)
Ui (X1 = 0) = 0
We rst characterize the second agents best reply. Dene K2 =  

p+ 1 2
1 12h

 
2
1 12C.
Lemma 9 (i) Suppose agent 1 has exerted e¤ort and followed his signal. Then
agent 2 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal if and only if K2 < K2 . If this condition
fails to hold, agent 2 does not exert e¤ort, but simply accepts the project. (ii) If
instead agent 1 has not exerted e¤ort, agent 2 does and follows his signal
To grasp the idea behind Lemma 9, suppose agent 1 has exerted e¤ort. If agent
2 exerts e¤ort, this implies that he is willing to act upon his information. In partic-
ular, he is willing to incur a cost K2 by rejecting the project in case of a negative
assessment. Hence, for agent 2 to exert e¤ort he should not care too much about
showing an opinion di¤erent from agent 1, or K2 < K2 . Of course, if agent 1 does
not exert e¤ort, it follows from assumption 2 that agent 2 will.
Now we turn to the equilibria of this model. Dene K1 =  

p+ 2 1
1 12h

 
4
1 12C.
Proposition 2 Suppose utility functions are dened as in (14). (i) If K2 < K2 and
K1 < K

1 , then both agents exert e¤ort and follow their respective signals. (ii) If
K2 < K

2 and K1  K1 , agent 1 forwards the project to agent 2 without analysing it;
agent 2 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal. (iii) If K2  K2 and 12 (1   2)h  C,
then agent 1 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal; agent 2 chooses X2 = 1 without
analyzing the project. (iv) If K2  K2 and 12 (1   2)h < C, 1 forwards the project
to 2 without analysing it; agent 2 then exerts e¤ort and follows his signal.
There is an important di¤erence between this model and the one discussed in the
previous sections. In the previous model, the degree to which agent 1 cares about
his reputation does not inuence his decisions. As in equilibrium he cannot inuence
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his expected reputation, he bases his decisions on project payo¤ comparisons only.
It can therefore not happen that agent 2 is willing to exert e¤ort and follow his
signal, but that agent 1 refrains from exerting e¤ort. In the present model, however,
this is exactly what happens in situation (ii). The fact that agent 2 exerts e¤ort
and follows his signal, K2 < K2 , and therefore rejects the project in case of a bad
signal, withholds agent 1 from exerting e¤ort if he su¢ ciently dislikes disagreeing
with agent 2, K1  K1 . The other three parts of the proposition are in line with
what we found in the previous sections. Parts (i), (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 2 are
similar to parts 1, 5 and 6 of Proposition 1, respectively.
5 Discussion
We have analysed the implications of endogenising information collection and rep-
utational concerns for the performance of a sequential decision structure. In our
model, two agents decide in a sequence whether or not to implement a public project.
Each agent is concerned with the outcomes of the project and wants to be reputed
as being smart. From the herding literature we know that in a sequential decision
structure, reputational concerns may lead to herding. The reason for herding is that
agent 2 hurts her reputation by disagreeing with agent 1. Since herding implies that
private information is ignored, herding is ine¢ cient from a social point of view.
We show that endogenising information a¤ects the nature of the herding result
in two ways. First, given that agent 1 collects information and acts on it, agent 2
does not collect information if she anticipates that she will ignore it when making
a decision about the project. Not exerting e¤ort and following agent 1s decision
dominates exerting e¤ort and following agent 1s decision.
The second way the herding result is a¤ected is that with endogenous information
agent 1 often chooses not to collect information, thereby delegating the decision
about the project to agent 2. The reason for this result is a free-rider problem. If
agent 2 cares considerably about her reputation, the choice agent 1 faces is between
exerting e¤ort himself or delegating the decision to agent 2. Joint decision making
is unattainable. Unless agent 1 is much smarter than agent 2, agent 1 prefers a
situation in which agent 2 collects information and makes the decision about the
project to a situation in which he does the dirty work himself. This second e¤ect of
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endogenising information is important for the answer to the question who e¤ectively
makes the decision about the project. With exogenous information and herding, it is
the rst agent in the sequence who e¤ectively makes the decision about the project.
With endogenous information, it is more likely that the second agent makes the
decision.
The herding literature shows that reputational concerns may lead to a distortion
in the decision process. An important result of our analysis is that with endogenous
information an ine¢ cient outcome is more likely to occur. The reason is that even
if agent 2 would not herd if she had collected information, reputational concerns
increase the cost of acquiring information. The increase in cost stems from the
fact that if agent 2 makes a decision in accordance with her information, she may
hurt her reputation. Not collecting information and agreeing with agent 1 is always
optimal from a reputation point of view.
A direct implication of our results is that in organizations the best man for the
job is not always the individual who is most likely to be smart. To prevent agent
1 from delegating the decision about the project to agent 2, an organization may
appoint a candidate who is smart with a lower probability than another candidate.
The reason is simple. The higher is the probability that the rst agent is smart,
the stronger is the incentive for the second agent to herd. By hiring an individual
who has a relatively low probability of being smart, an organization may prevent
the second person from herding. Then, agent 1 has weaker incentives to delegate
the decision to the second agent.
In the introduction, we have already mentioned that potentially there are advan-
tages of a sequential decision procedure. We have shown that endogenizing infor-
mation collection makes sequential decision procedures more vulnerable to adverse
consequences of reputational concerns. One interpretation of this result is that in
situations in which reputational concerns are important, decisions will not be made
by means of a sequential decision procedure. One alternative is delegating the de-
cision to a single agent. When a single agent does not know her type, reputational
concerns will not a¤ect her decision on the project (Suurmond, Swank and Visser,
2004). Another alternative is a decision procedure according to which two agents
make independent recommendations, so that herding cannot occur.
In this paper, we have assumed that the actual quality of the project will not
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be observed. The implication of this assumption was that the agentsreputations
directly follow from their decisions on the project. As only the signals of smart
agents are correlated, agreement between agents signals competence, whereas dis-
agreement signals incompetence. At the expense of more algebra, we could have
obtained qualitatively similar results in a setting in which (1) the quality of the
project is eventually observed; (2) the quality of the project is dened as the sum
of two random variables of which one is observed by the agents and the other is
not observed; and (3) only the signals of two smart agents are correlated. These
assumptions imply that ceteris paribus agreement between the agents still yields a
better reputation than disagreement. This holds even if the project turns out the be
of low quality. In that case, agreement between the agents makes it relatively more
likely that the bad quality is the result of the unobserved random variable. Notice
the importance of the existence of the unobserved random variable. Without it,
reputations would not depend on agreement or disagreement, but only on whether
the agentsdecisions are in line with the quality of the project.
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Appendix
In this section, we rst provide some useful mathematical derivations (subsection
A.1), we then show that the conditions formulated in the assumptions create the
desired environment (A.2), and nally prove the lemmas and the main proposition
(A.3). To save space, we write giinstead of si = g, and biinstead of si = b.
Also, instead of writing  = hwe write h.
A.1 Useful expressions
It is useful to start with the following (un)conditional probabilities and expected
values Pr (hjgi) = i + 12 (1  i) = 12 (1 + i). Thus
Pr (hjgi) = 1
2
(1 + i)
Pr ( hjgi) = 1
2
(1  i)
Pr (hjbi) = 1
2
(1  i)
Pr ( hjbi) = 1
2
(1 + i) (A.1)
Hence,
E (jgi) = ih =  E (jbi) (A.2)
In case of two signals,
Pr (gi; bjjh) = 1
2
(1  i) 1
2
(1 + j)
Pr (gi; bjj   h) = 1
2
(1  i) 1
2
(1 + j)
Pr (gi; gjjh) = 1
2
(1 + i)
1
2
(1 + j)
Pr (gi; gjj   h) = 1
2
(1  i) 1
2
(1  j) (A.3)
Therefore
Pr (hjgi; bj) = (1 + i) (1  j)
2 (1  ij)
Pr ( hjgi; bj) = (1  i) (1 + j)
2 (1  ij) (A.4)
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Hence,
E (jgi; bj) = i   j
1  ij h and E (jgi; gj) =
i + j
1 + ij
h (A.5)
Also,
Pr (gi; gj) = Pr (gi; gjjh) Pr (h) + Pr (gi; gjj   h) Pr ( h) = 1
4
(1 + 12) (A.6)
So
Pr (gjjgi) = Pr (gi; gj)
Pr (gi)
=
1
2
(1 + 12) (A.7)
A.2 The Assumptions
We now show that the conditions formulated in the assumptions create the desired
environment. Assumption 1 guarantees that an individual agent implements the
project if he receives signal gi, p+E (jgi) = p+ih > 0. This follows from equation
(A.2). That Assumption 2 ensures that e¤ort is exerted and the signal followed is
then immediate. From equation (A.5) it follows that the correct expression has been
used in Assumption 3.
Assumption 4 should guarantee that agent 2, conditional on agent 1 having
exerted e¤ort and having followed his signal, has an interest in exerting e¤ort. Im-
plementing the project rightaway yields p + 1h. Exerting e¤ort and following her
signal yields Pr (g2jg1) [p+ E (jg1; g2)] C = 12 (1 + 12) p+ 12 (1 + 2)h C (see
equations (A.5) and (A.7)). Thus, e¤ort is exerted if Assumption 4 holds. Finally,
assumption 5 should ensure that if agent 2 already exerts e¤ort and follows her
signal, it is in the interest of agent 1 to do the same and refer a project to agent 1
only if s1 = g. The expected payo¤ for agent 1 if he refrains from exerting e¤ort
equals 1
2
(p+ 2h). If agent 1 participates, the expected payo¤ for him amounts to
Pr (g1) [Pr (g2jg1) [p+ E (jg1; g2)]] C = 14 (1 + 12) p+ 14 (1 + 2)h C. Agent
1 exerts e¤ort if Assumption 5 holds.
A.3 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: Recall that we assume that the strategy of agent 1 is to exert
e¤ort and follow his signal. The imputed strategy of agent 2 is to exert e¤ort with
probability , to implement if s2 = g, to implement with probability  if s2 = b,
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and to implement if no e¤ort is exerted. We will show that with this strategyb2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 1)  2 > b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 0). It is then directly clear that if
agent 2 does not exert e¤ort, she prefers project implementation to maintaining the
status quo. Project implementation yields both a higher reputation and a positive
project payo¤ by assumption 2.
Of course, b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 0) = Pr (t2 = smjX1 = 1; X2 = 0). Given the im-
puted strategy, X1 = 1 implies s1 = g, whereas X2 = 0 implies that agent 2 has
exerted e¤ort and received a signal s2 = b. Thus, Pr (X1 = 1; X2 = 0jt2 = sm) =
1
2
 (1  1) 12 , because if 2 is smart the only way for agents 1 and 2 to have received
opposing signals is for agent 1 to be dumb. Similarly, Pr (X1 = 1; X2 = 0jt2 = du) =
1
2

 
1
1
2
+ (1  1) 12

= 1
4
, as the signal of a dumb agent is uncorrelated with that
of the rst agent. Using Bayes rule we derive b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 0) = 1 11 122, which
is equation (2). To calculate b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 1) recall that with the imputed strat-
egy agent 2 implements a project either because she exerted e¤ort and received a
signal s2 = g; because she exerted e¤ort and she received a signal s2 = b and imple-
mented with probability ; or because she did not exert e¤ort. Moreover, agent 1,
who passed on the project to agent 2 must have received a signal s1 = g. Thus,
Pr (X1 = 1; X2 = 1jt2 = sm)
= Pr (h) Pr (g1jh) [ [Pr (g2jh; t2 = sm) + Pr (b2jh; t2 = sm) ] + (1  )]
+Pr ( h) Pr (g1j   h) [ [Pr (g2j   h; t2 = sm) + Pr (b2j   h; t2 = sm) ] + (1  )]
=
1
2
1 + 1
2
[ + (1  )] + 1
2
1  1
2
[ + (1  )]
=
1
2
1 + 1
2
+
1
2
1  1
2
[ + (1  )]
=
1
4
(2  (1  1) (1  ) )
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And
Pr (X1 = 1; X2 = 1jt2 = du)
= Pr (h) Pr (g1jh) [ [Pr (g2jh; t2 = du) + Pr (b2jh; t2 = du) ] + (1  )]
+Pr ( h) Pr (g1j   h) [ [Pr (g2j   h; t2 = du) + Pr (b2j   h; t2 = du) ] + (1  )]
=
1
2
1 + 1
2


1
2
+ 
1
2
 + (1  )

+
1
2
1  1
2


1
2
+ 
1
2
 + (1  )

=
1
4
[ (1 + ) + 2 (1  )]
From this it immediately follows that b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 1) equals the expression in
equation (3), b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 1) = 2 (1 )(1 1)2 (1 )(1 12)2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: If agent 2 has received a negative signal, whether she prefers
to reject or to implement the project is determined by the sign of expression (6).
Three cases are possible as far as consistency of agent 2s actions an posterior beliefs
are concerned. In case (i), the expression in (6) is negative for  = 0 substituted
in b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 1)   b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 0). Thus, in this case agent 2 always
rejects the project if s2 = b. Notice that (6) to be negative for  = 0 requires that
 < , where  denotes the value for which (6) equals zero for  = 0. In case
(ii), the expression in (6) is positive for  = 1 substituted in b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 1) b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 0). Agent 2 always accepts the project if s2 = b ( = 1). Rather
than using her private information, she herds. Case (ii) requires that agent 2 cares
su¢ ciently about her reputation, or  >  where  is the value of  such that the
expression in (6) equals zero for  = 1. Finally, in case (iii), agent 2 is indi¤erent
between implementation and rejection for some  2 [0; 1]. This could be called
probabilistic herding. Case (iii) happens for intermediate values of :  2 [; ].
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: See the text preceding the statement of the lemma. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4: This lemma assumes that agent 1 exerts e¤ort and follows his
signal. We rst show formally that C < 
. Recall that  is such that expression
(6) equals zero for  = 0. This expression can be rewritten as
1
2
(12   1) p+ 1
2
(2   1)h+
1
2
(12   1) [b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 1)  b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 0)] (A.8)
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If, for  = 0 substituted in b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 1) b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 0), this expression
is positive, agent 2 follows her signal. The payo¤ to agent 2 if she exerts e¤ort equals
1
2
(1 + 12) p+
1
2
(1 + 2)h+
1
2
(1 + 12)b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 1) +
1
2
(1  12)b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 0)  C (A.9)
whereas the payo¤ if she does not exert e¤ort amounts to
p+ 1h+ b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 1) (A.10)
A comparison of these expressions shows that whether agent 2 prefers exerting e¤ort
or not is determined by the sign of
1
2
(12   1) p+ 1
2
(2   1)h  C +
1
2
(12   1) [b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 1)  b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 0)] (A.11)
If this expression is positive, agent 2 exerts e¤ort. By construction, expression (A.8)
equals zero for  =  and  = 0. A comparison of (A.8) and (A.11) implies that
(A.11) is negative for  =  and  = 0, implying that agent 2 does not exert e¤ort,
or  = 0. This also implies that C < 
. Let C be the value of  for which
(A.11) equals zero after substituting  = 1 and  = 0 into b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 1)  b2 (X1 = 1; X2 = 0). If  < C , agent 2 always exerts e¤ort and will always follow
her signal. Finally, in the third case, we have that C    C , and agent 2 exerts
e¤ort with probability  2 [0; 1], where  is the root of (A.11) with  = 1: agent
2 will always follow her signal (if she has one), since C < 
. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5: See the text preceding the statement of the lemma. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6: See the text preceding the statement of the lemma. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 7: See the text preceding the statement of the lemma. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 8: See the text preceding the statement of the lemma. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: This follows immediately from the lemma 4, and from
lemmas 6-8. It may not be directly clear that the constraints in cases (3) and
(4) in the proposition are satised for some parameter constellations. Suppose
1
2
(1   2)h < C. Then one can nd values

C ; C
	
as long as Assumption 4
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holds (this assumption implies that the top line of (A.11) is positive, while the bot-
tom line is negative for all parameter values). Therefore suppose 1
2
(1   2)h < C
and  2 C ; C. Note that the value of  2 (0; 1) is independent of , see (13).
Furthermore,  is continuous in , and, if  # C , then  " 1, while if  " C ,
then  # 0 . This guarantees that either case (3) or (4) holds, depending on the
parameter values. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 9: Part (i): First assume that agent 2 has exerted e¤ort. If
s2 = g, he will accept the project as p + 1+21+12h > 0 >  K2. If instead s2 = b, he
will reject the project if and only if K2 <  

p+ 1 2
1 12h

. Now consider agent 2s
decision whether to exert e¤ort or not. Assume that once e¤ort has been exerted,
he will follow his signal. Exerting e¤ort then yields
1
2
(1 + 12)

p+
1 + 2
1 + 12
h

+
1
2
(1  12) ( K2)  C
while not exerting e¤ort will induce him to implement the project as p + 1h >
0 >  K2. Hence, he exerts e¤ort if and only if K2 + 21 12C <  

p+ 1 2
1 12h

.
Clearly, if this inequality holds, he will follow his signal. Part (ii): This holds by
assumption 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose that agent 2 exerts e¤ort (and therefore follows
his signal) if agent 1 exerts e¤ort and follows his signal, K2 < K2 . Assume agent 1
exerts e¤ort. Will he follow his signal? If s1 = b, then X1 = 0 best as this yields
 C, which is more than 1
2
(1  12)

p+ 2 1
1 12h

+ 1
2
(1 + 12) ( K1)   C (as
p+ 2 1
1 12h < 0 and  K1 < 0). If s1 = g, agent 1 chooses X1 = 1 if and only if
1
2
(1 + 12)

p+
1 + 2
1 + 12
h

+
1
2
(1  12) ( K1) > 0. (A.12)
Now suppose that K2  K2 , implying that if agent 1 exerts e¤ort and follows his
signal, agent 2 does not exert e¤ort and implements the project. If agent 1 exerts
e¤ort, it is straightforward to see that he follows his signal.
Will agent 1 exert e¤ort? If he does not exert e¤ort, his payo¤ equals
1
2
(p+ 2h)
Assume K2 < K2 . If (A.12) holds, 1 follows his signal conditional on having one.
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Agent 1 exerts e¤ort if and only if
1
4
(1 + 12)

p+
1 + 2
1 + 12
h

+
1
4
(1  12) ( K1)  C > 1
2
(p+ 2h)
or K1 < K1 =  

p+ 2 1
1 12h

  4
1 12C. Clearly, if 1 exerts e¤ort, then he follows
his signal. This proves part (i). If instead K1  K1 , agent 1 does not exert e¤ort
but forwards the project to agent 2. The latter then exerts e¤ort and follows his
signal by assumption 2. This completes the proof of part (ii).
Now assume K2  K2 . Then agent 2 does not exert e¤ort if agent 1 does. Agent
1 exerts e¤ort himself if 1
2
(1   2)h > C. If this inequality does not hold, he
forwards the project to agent 2 without analysing it. The latter exerts e¤ort and
follows his signal by assumption 2. This completes the proof of parts (iii) and (iv).
Q.E.D.
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